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It is reported previously that, in contracting out waste collection services to pri-
vate enterprises, there is generally an inverse relationship between the contracting-
out rate and the contract price, but this inverse relationship levels out as the degree
of contracting-out increases and the contract price even goes up eventually as the
contracting rate approaches 100%. In this paper, we construct a simple bargain-
ing model between municipal governments and private firms and identify how the
bargaining equilibrium differs from an outcome where municipal governments can
make take-it-or-leave-it offers to private enterprises. Through a simple simulation
analysis, in addition, we demonstrate that hold-up concerns of local governments
can indeed lead to a U-shaped relationship between the contracting-out rate and
the contract price across different municipalities.
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1 Introduction
It is common in developed nations that local authorities are legally responsible for the
collection and disposal of household waste. Since around the 1980’s, the contracting-out
of household waste collection services to private firms has been widely promoted. In the
case of Japan, contracting-out was encouraged primarily to ease the burden of munici-
pal governments, which were sometimes financially troubled, by reducing the operating
expenditure of waste collection services in general. This trend was further strengthened
during the 90’s when Japan experienced a prolonged recession and also when the priva-
tization and contracting-out of “blue-collar” public services, including waste collection
and disposal services, became even more politically fashionable among many developed
countries.
Although there exist a number of empirical studies that identify significant cost sav-
ings from contracting out municipal waste collection services to private contractors,1
few studies analytically examine what actually determines the political decision-makers’
choice between private and public firms (Ohlsson 2003). One interesting feature of their
decision-makings is that contracting-out is not necessarily an all-or-nothing deal, as we
will see below for the case of household waste collection services in Japan. That is, it is
often the case that a local government contracts out a certain portion of services to pri-
vate firms but still keeps its own public operation unit despite the overwhelming empirical
evidences that contracting-out would results in significant cost reductions for municipal
governments.
In their recent study, Matsueda and Miki (2017) report that, based on their own survey
conducted in 2004 for 412 local municipalities all across Japan, there was generally an
inverse relationship between the contracting-out rate and the contract price, which is
shown in Figure 1.
1Based on the observations of 340 public and private firms in the US, Stevens (1978) indicated a cost
decrease of 7 to 30% due to the contracting-out. For a sample of 205 Canadian cities, McDavid (1985)
reported that public collection was 41% more expensive than private collection. Domberger et al. (1986)
estimated the cost savings of 22% for contracting out household refuse collection in the UK. Reeves and
Barrow (2000) showed that there is an enormous cost saving opportunity of around 45% for Ireland.
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) identified the cost savings of approximately 15 to 20% for the Netherlands.
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Figure 1: Contracting-out rates and contract prices in Japan
The solid quadratic regression line also indicates that this inverse relationship flattens
as the contracting rate increases, and the contract price even moves up eventually as
the contracting rate approaches 100%. While Matsueda and Miki (2017) suggest several
potential sources that could lead to the inverse relationship between the contract price and
the rate of contracting-out, they did not discuss why the contract price levels out and even
goes up as the rate becomes sufficiently close to 100%. Indeed, such a phenomenon has
rarely been reported in previous empirical studies, much less investigated analytically.
Those studies have mainly focused on the comparisons of the collection costs between
fully-public and fully-contracted-out entities and, in our opinion, left some intriguing
phenomena, such as this one, unexplored.
In this paper, we investigate into this U-shaped relationship by constructing a simple
bargaining model between municipal governments and private enterprises. In particular,
we focus on the municipalities’ hold-up concerns. Most household wastes need to be
hauled away within a fairly short time-frame, usually weekly or twice weekly, due to
public health and sanitation concerns. Once a municipal government fully contracts out
its waste collection services to private firms and stops investing in its internal unit, it
could create an environment where a private firm is able to make a better case for a
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higher contract price by shifting the balance of bargaining positions in favor of a private
firm. In particular, a private firm could threaten to go on a strike unless the contract
price is raised. Such an issue would become more serious when a local government loses
some pertinent skills and information in conducting waste collection services in a fairly
efficient manner within a particular district.
As we demonstrate analytically below in a bargaining equilibrium, an important con-
sequence of this hold-up concern is that, by anticipating the potential problem, a local
government might decide to keep a larger portion of waste collecting operation internally
than its simple expenditure-minimization would justify. In Figure 1, we can see that
there are many municipalities that choose quite high percentages of contracting-out, but
still retain a certain share of internal provision of waste collection services. The hold-up
possibility that they could potentially face is one probable rationale for cutting down on
the rate of contracting-out for municipalities.2
Such a hold-up situation would be more likely to pose a serious problem with a
fewer number of potential contractors in a market, because then market forces could not
completely wipe out the effect of even a false claim and also because firms are easier to
collude to raise a tender price. Domberger and Jensen (1997) write, “[c]ontracting out is
likely to be more (less) successful whenever the availability of competitive supply in the
market, both actual or potential, is large (small)”. In the following analysis, we suppose
that the competitiveness of a contracting market is reflected in the relative magnitudes
of bargaining powers between a municipality and a potential contractor.
In the next section we set up a simple analytical model and examine its implications in
order to gain insights into how the contracting-out decision by a municipal government is
affected by the hold-up concerns. In the following section, we conducts a simple simulation
analysis to illustrate how a U-shaped relationship emerges between the rate of contracting-
out and the contract price across different municipalities. The final section concludes the
paper.
2This is a completely different kind of hold up situation that has been discussed in the literature.
Domberger and Jensen (1997) mentioned that the public ownership of the assets, such as specialized
vehicles, and the existence of “relation-specific investments” that are sunk expenditures by the contractor
results in under-investment, following a more general argument by Hart (1995).
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2 The Model
In this section, we set up a simple analytical model with a local government and a
potential private contractor in order to gain some insights into how household waste
collection services are contracted out and, especially, how the size of the contracting
price is related to the degree of contracting-out in a municipality.
2.1 Basic Set-ups
Let us suppose that there are I municipalities in total and each municipality is indexed
by i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Each municipality contains J districts within itself and a district is
indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.3 We assume that there is a total waste amount of Gij that
needs to be collected in a district j of a municipality i, and Gij is given exogenously.
A budget-conscious municipal government aims to minimize its total expenditure
associated with collecting this amount of waste by choosing how much of Gij is collected
by a public enterprise and how much of it is contracted out to a private firm. We assume
that there is a unique private firm in each district, mainly for the sake of simplicity, and
discuss the implications of having multiple private firms which can potentially serve the
same district later in the context of the “generalized” Nash bargaining solution.
We suppose that, in the absence of any investment (or effort) by the municipal gov-
ernment, the marginal cost of collecting waste through a public channel, which is denoted
by bij, is greater than the marginal collection cost by a private enterprise, cij. However,
the marginal cost of public waste collection service can by lowered through a deliberate
investment by a municipal government. Such an investment reflects a government’s ef-
forts to keep its waste collection section operational and more efficient. Specifically, we
assume that the following equation holds:
aij = bij − eij, (1)
where eij is the level of investment by this particular municipal government i in each
district j, and aij is the marginal cost of collecting waste by this public firm after the
3Alternatively, different districts can be interpreted as different types of household wastes, such as
burnable, non-burnable and recyclable wastes.
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investment. Thus, a size of investment is measured in terms of its contribution to the
resulting reduction in marginal collection cost.
We suppose that the cost of investment is given by the following quadratic form:
1
2
γij (eij)
2. It seems reasonable that the value of γij depends on the size of the waste,
Gij, since it would be more costly to decrease one unit of the marginal collection cost if
the collection volume is larger, for instance, due possibly to a larger collection area or
to an increase in the varieties of waste. Thus, we will rewrite γij as γij(Gij) later, but,
for the simplicity of notation, we suppress the function’s argument for the time being.
Furthermore, we assume thateij has no spillover effect to other districts.
The order of the interactions is as follows. First, each municipal government i chooses
the contracting-out rate αij for each district j. Thus, αijGij amount of waste is collected
by a public firm and (1− αij)Gij amount of waste is contracted out to a private firm in a
district j of a municipality i. Next, the municipal government chooses the amount of in-
vestment, eij.
4 Finally, the contract price is determined through the negotiation between
the municipal government and the private firm. Instead of modeling the negotiation
process in a specific non-cooperative game-theoretic manner, we resort to the general-
ized Nash bargaining solution, following the now well-established works on incomplete
contracts (e.g., Hart 1995).
2.2 The Total Expenditure Minimization
Before deriving the equilibrium outcome of the above sequential game that involves a
bargaining, as a benchmark outcome, let us obtain the result where a municipal govern-
ment can make a take-it-or-offer to a private firm. This is essentially the hypothetical
case where the government does not have to deal with a potential hold-up issue at all.
For a given contracting-out rate, αij, let e
O
ij be the level of the municipal government’s
investment which minimizes the total expenditure associated with collecting the waste
amount of Gij, including the cost of investment as well as the payment to a private
firm, which is simply its total collection cost in this case. Thus, eOij solves the following
minimization problem:
4It is also possible that a private sector makes an investment choice as well, but we do not model it
for the sake of simplicity as it would not change the qualitative implications obtained below.
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min
eij
(bij − eij) (1− αij)Gij + cijαijGij + 1
2
γij (eij)
2 , (2)
whose first-order condition leads to
eOij =
(1− αij)Gij
γij
. (3)
Given (3), the total-expenditure minimizing contracting-out rate, αOij, solves the fol-
lowing problem:
min
αij
(
bij − eOij
)
(1− αij)Gij + cijαijGij + 1
2
γij
(
eOij
)2
. (4)
In light of the envelope theorem, the first-order condition for (4) is given by
0 = − (bij − eOij)Gij + cijGij = −Gij [(bij − cij)− (1− αij)Gijγij
]
, (5)
which yields:
αij = 1− γij (bij − cij)
Gij
. (6)
Since −G2ij
γij
< 0, the second derivative of the objective function in (2) is negative, implying
the function is a concave and quadratic function in αij. Invoking that γij is actually a
function of Gij, or, γij = γij(Gij), therefore, we can conclude
αOij =
 01 if
γij(Gij)
Gij
(bij − cij) ≤ 12
if
γij(Gij)
Gij
(bij − cij) > 12
. (7)
Note that the difference, bij − cij, measures how inefficient the public enterprise is in
relation to the private firm before the investment and, if the difference is sufficiently
large to allow the value of
γij(Gij)
Gij
(bij − cij) to exceed 12 , the municipal government i can
minimize the total expenditure by entirely contracting out the waste collection service in
its district j. Otherwise, the expenditure-minimizing choice is to provide the collection
services totally on its own.
From (7), we can easily see that an increase in the cost of investment adjusted for
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the scale of the waste, i.e.,
γij(Gij)
Gij
,5 or in the ex ante difference between the marginal
collection costs of the public and private sectors promotes the contracting-out, which are
both quite intuitive.
2.3 The Bargaining Equilibrium
2.3.1 The Third (Bargaining) Stage
Given the levels of ex post marginal costs of collecting waste by the public and private
enterprises, i.e., aij and cij, respectively, the total expenditure of collecting the waste Gij
to the municipal government is
aij (1− αij)Gij + cijαijGij = [aij (1− αij) + cijαij]Gij, (8)
if the contracting-out rate of αij is actually implemented. If all the waste collection is
conducted publicly, the total cost is aijGij.
We suppose that the bargaining outcome is given by the generalized Nash bargaining
solution. Let us assume that aij > cij holds. Then, if we denote the players’ payoffs
as the negatives of the costs they respectively incur, the sum of the payoffs of the local
government and the private firm can be written as
fij + gij = − [aij (1− αij) + cijαij]Gij, (9)
where fij and gij are the respective payoffs of the private firm and the municipal govern-
ment for this stage alone, only concerning this particular district. We suppose that the
disagreement implies that the public sector must provide all the waste collection service
for the district. In such a case, the government’s payoff, i.e., gij is −aijGij, and the pri-
vate firm’s payoff, i.e, fij, becomes zero as it will not provide any service in this particular
district.
With η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) denoting the bargaining power of the private firm and, conse-
quently, 1− η the bargaining power of the municipal government, the respective parties’
5If γij(Gij) is linear in Gij , the size of the waste has no effect on the chosen contracting-rate in (7).
On the other hand, if γij(Gij) is strictly convex (resp. concave), a larger waste size encourages (resp.
discourages) the contracting-out decision by the municipal government.
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payoffs in the generalized Nash bargaining solution are the ones that solves the following
problem:
max
fij ,gij
f ηij (gij + aijGij)
1−η s.t. fij + gij = − [aij (1− αij) + cijαij]Gij. (10)
Solving the maximization problem above, we can obtain the private firm’s payoff in the
generalized Nash bargaining solution, denoted by f ∗ij, as
f ∗ij = η (aij − cij)αijGij. (11)
From (11), we can derive the contract price in the generalized Nash bargaining solution
as
η (aij − cij) + cij = ηaij + (1− η) cij, (12)
by taking into account the marginal cost of waste collection service by the private firm.
It should be noted that, as η goes to zero, i.e., the bargaining power of the private firm
diminishes, the contract price approaches its own marginal cost of collection. When η = 0,
it effectively coincides with the non-bargaining case analyzed in the previous subsection
.
On the other hand, the government’s payoff in the generalized Nash bargaining solu-
tion, denoted by g∗ij, is
g∗ij = −aij (1− αij)Gij − (ηaij + (1− η) cij)αijGij, (13)
where the first term is the collection cost by the public enterprise and the second term is
the payment made to the private firm, given the contract price above.
2.3.2 The Second (Investment) Stage
Taking into account the value of g∗ij that is determined in the subsequent stage as in
(13), the municipal government chooses the level of its investment eij that minimizes the
total expenditure associated with collecting the waste of size Gij. Hence, the government
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solves the following the problem:
min
eij
−g∗ij +
γij
2
e2ij = (bij − eij) (1− αij)Gij + (ηaij + (1− η) cij)αijGij +
γij
2
e2ij, (14)
given the level of αij that has been determined in the preceding stage. Its first-order
condition is
(1− αij)Gij + ηαijGij = γijeij. (15)
Here, the first term on the left hand side represents the effect of an increase in eij on its
own collection cost and the second term is its effect on lowering the contracting-out price
determined in the following stage by increasing the government’s disagreement payoff.
We can see that an increase in αij lessens the former effect but it boosts the latter effect.
From (15), we can see that the government’s optimal level of investment, eij , is given
by
e∗ij =
1− (1− η)αij
γij
Gij ≥ eOij, (16)
which indicates that the direct effect of an increase in αij on the public waste collection
cost overwhelms its effect on the government disagreement payoff in total. This im-
plies that, when the contracting-out rate increases, the government responds by lowering
its investment that reduces the public enterprise’s collection cost, even if it recognizes
that a smaller investment would worsen its bargaining position in the subsequent stage.
Moreover, (16) implies that the equilibrium investment level is always lower than the
social-cost minimizing investment level except for the case of no contracting-out whatso-
ever, i.e. αij = 0 and also for the case where the private firm has no bargaining power in
the subsequent negotiation stage, i.e., η = 0.
Given (16), we need the following condition for having aij > cij:
bij − e∗ij > cij ⇔ αij >
1
1− η
[
1− γij
Gij
(bij − cij)
]
. (17)
The last condition may not be met when αij is sufficiently small. If that is indeed the
case, the agreement between the government and the private firm will not be reached and
all the waste must be collected by the public enterprise since it is more efficient than the
private counterpart. As a result, the payoffs in the third stage alone will be gij = −aijGij
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and fij = 0. In this case, the optimal investment by the government is given by the
solution to the following problem:
min
eij
−g∗ij +
γij
2
e2ij = (bij − eij)αij +
γij
2
e2ij, (18)
which yields e∗ij =
Gij
γij
= eOij. If the condition (17) is met, the contract price in the
bargaining equilibrium is
η
(
bij − e∗ij
)
+ (1− η) cij =
[
ηbij + (1− η) cij − ηGij
γij
]
+
η (1− η)Gij
γij
αij. (19)
Thus, the contract price increases as αij gets bigger because an increase in the
contracting-out rate aggravates the disagreement payoff of the municipal government,
which will work against the government in the following bargaining stage.
2.3.3 The First (Contract) Stage
In this initial stage, the municipal government chooses the level of the contracting-out
rate, αij, so as to minimize its total expenditure, including the cost of investment in the
second stage. Therefore, it solves the following problem:
min
αij
(
bij − e∗ij
)
(1− αij)Gij +
[
η
(
bij − e∗ij
)
+ (1− η) cij
]
αijGij +
γij
2
(
e∗ij
)2
. (20)
Let us, for the moment, suppose that the condition (17) holds for such a level of
αij. In light of the envelope theorem again and combination with (16), the first-order
condition for (20) is given by
0 = − (bij − e∗ij)Gij + [η (bij − e∗ij)+ (1− η) cij]Gij
= − (1− η)
(
bij − 1−(1−η)αijγij Gij
)
Gij + (1− η) cijGij.
(21)
Solving (21) for αij yields
αij =
1
1− η
[
1− γij (bij − cij)
Gij
]
, (22)
which exactly coincides with the threshold of whether the agreement between the mu-
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nicipal government and the private firm will be reached or not in (17). Since the second
derivative of the objective function in (20) is − (1−η)
2G2ij
γij
< 0, it is a concave and quadratic
function in αij, and, therefore, the value of the objective function monotonically decreases
as αij goes up from its value in (22).
If αij in (22) exceeds one-half, the government will collect all the waste through the
public enterprise, i.e., αij = 0, and the optimal investment becomes e
∗
ij =
Gij
γij
. On the
other hand, if αij in (22) is smaller than one-half, the optimal contracting-rate should be
one. Invoking γij = γij(Gij), once again, we can conclude that the optimal contracting-
out rate, α∗ij, which the municipal government should choose, is given by
α∗ij =
 01 if
γij(Gij)
Gij
(bij − cij) ≤ 12 + η2
if
γij(Gij)
Gij
(bij − cij) > 12 + η2
. (23)
which indicates that the choice of α∗ij by the municipal government is distorted downwards
in comparison with (7) which minimizes the total expenditure of waste collection without
any bargaining. In the bargaining equilibrium, however, the municipal government tends
to over-invest in the second stage in anticipation of the bargaining over the contract price
in the subsequent stage, and this makes the contracting-out to the private enterprise a less
attractive option for the municipal government. In summary, we can state the following:
Proposition 1. As long as a private firm has a positive bargaining power, it is always
the case that the contracting-out rate in the bargaining equilibrium is smaller than the
expenditure-minimizing contracting-out rate in the absence of any bargaining power on
the side of the private firm.
We can also note that an increase in the cost of investment adjusted for the scale of
the waste, i.e.,
γij(Gij)
Gij
, or in the ex ante difference between the marginal collection costs
of the public and private sectors, bij − cij, promotes the contracting-out, just as in the
non-bargaining case.
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3 Simulation
In this section, we present a simple simulation result which illustrate how a U-shaped rela-
tionship arises between the rate of contracting-out and the contract price across different
municipalities.
As we have identified in the previous section, for a given distribution of bargaining
powers, there are two main factors which influences the municipal government’s decision
on whether to contract out or not waste collection services in a certain district: the cost
of investment adjusted for the scale of the waste (or, the degree of investment efficiency)
and the ex ante difference between the marginal collection costs of the public and private
sectors.
In the following simulation analysis, we have eighteen municipalities, each of which
contains four districts of the same size, and assign them different values of
γij(Gij)
Gij
and
bij − cij. For simplicity, we fix the level of the parameter η at one half, thus endowing
the equal bargaining powers to a municipal government and to a private firm in each
district. The two tables in the appendix summarizes the particular values assigned to
the eighteen municipalities. The first eight municipalities contain districts with different
degrees of investment efficiency and the same ex ante difference between the marginal
collection costs by public and private enterprises, whereas the next ten municipalities
contain district with the same degree of investment efficiency but varying ex ante cost
differences within respective municipalities. The tables also describe the resulting rates
of contracting and average contract prices for respective municipalities at the bargaining
equilibrium.
By plotting the data in a similar fashion to Figure 1 and regressing them to a quadratic
function, we obtain the following Figure:
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Figure 2: A simulation result
In fact, the equilibrium results obtained for the first eight municipalities gives a
upward-sloping regression line, while the next ten municipalities produces a downward-
sloping regression line. In combination, these two conflicting trends give rise to a U-
shaped relationship observed in Figure 2. Thus, we argue that the bargaing model exam-
ined in the previous section can indeed yield a phenomena that was observed in Figure
1.
4 Concluding Remarks
By examining a sequential game model of contracting-out waste collection services, which
also involves a bargaining over the contract price between the concerned parties, we
analytically show that, due to hold-up concerns, a municipal government tends to over-
invest in its own cost reduction and this leads to a smaller degree of contracting-out
chosen by local government. We also show, through utilizing a simulation, that these
results, in turn, can give rise to an U-shaped relationship between the contracting-out
ratio and the contract price of waste collection services across multiple municipalities
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with different characteristics.
Despite such a theoretical possibility and, moreover, increasing interest in contracting
out household waste collection services over time, this U-shaped relationship has seldom
attracted the attentions of researchers so far. The foremost importance should be given
to further empirical investigations, and the relationship between the contracting-out rate
and the contract price need to be scrutinized with more detailed data and also data from
different regions.
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Appendix A: Simulation Data
i j
γij(Gij)
Gij
bij cij contracting-out rate in i average contract price in i
1 1 0.7 2.0 1.4
0.50 0.968
1 2 0.7 2.0 1.1
1 3 0.7 2.0 0.8
1 4 0.7 2.0 0.5
2 1 0.8 2.0 1.4
0.50 1.013
2 2 0.8 2.0 1.1
2 3 0.8 2.0 0.8
2 4 0.8 2.0 0.5
3 1 0.9 2.0 1.4
0.75 1.122
3 2 0.9 2.0 1.1
3 3 0.9 2.0 0.8
3 4 0.9 2.0 0.5
4 1 1.0 2.0 1.4
0.75 1.150
4 2 1.0 2.0 1.1
4 3 1.0 2.0 0.8
4 4 1.0 2.0 0.5
5 1 1.1 2.0 1.4
0.75 1.173
5 2 1.1 2.0 1.1
5 3 1.1 2.0 0.8
5 4 1.1 2.0 0.5
6 1 1.2 2.0 1.4
0.75 1.192
6 2 1.2 2.0 1.1
6 3 1.2 2.0 0.8
6 4 1.2 2.0 0.5
7 1 1.3 2.0 1.4
1.00 1.283
7 2 1.3 2.0 1.1
7 3 1.3 2.0 0.8
7 4 1.3 2.0 0.5
8 1 1.4 2.0 1.4
1.00 1.296
8 2 1.4 2.0 1.1
8 3 1.4 2.0 0.8
8 4 1.4 2.0 0.5
Table 1: Eight municipalities with different degrees of investment efficiency
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i j
γij(Gij)
Gij
bij cij contracting-out rate in i average contract price in i
9 1 1.0 2.0 1.9
0.25 1.250
9 2 1.0 2.0 1.6
9 3 1.0 2.0 1.3
9 4 1.0 2.0 1.0
10 1 1.0 2.0 1.8
0.50 1.275
10 2 1.0 2.0 1.5
10 3 1.0 2.0 1.2
10 4 1.0 2.0 0.9
11 1 1.0 2.0 1.7
0.50 1.225
11 2 1.0 2.0 1.4
11 3 1.0 2.0 1.1
11 4 1.0 2.0 0.8
12 1 1.0 2.0 1.6
0.50 1.175
12 2 1.0 2.0 1.3
12 3 1.0 2.0 1.0
12 4 1.0 2.0 0.7
13 1 1.0 2.0 1.5
0.75 1.200
13 2 1.0 2.0 1.2
13 3 1.0 2.0 0.9
13 4 1.0 2.0 0.6
14 1 1.0 2.0 1.4
0.75 1.150
14 2 1.0 2.0 1.1
14 3 1.0 2.0 0.8
14 4 1.0 2.0 0.5
15 1 1.0 2.0 1.3
0.75 1.100
15 2 1.0 2.0 1.0
15 3 1.0 2.0 0.7
15 4 1.0 2.0 0.4
16 1 1.0 2.0 1.2
1.00 1.125
16 2 1.0 2.0 0.9
16 3 1.0 2.0 0.6
16 4 1.0 2.0 0.3
17 1 1.0 2.0 1.1
1.00 1.075
17 2 1.0 2.0 0.8
17 3 1.0 2.0 0.5
17 4 1.0 2.0 0.2
18 1 1.0 2.0 1.0
1.00 1.025
18 2 1.0 2.0 0.7
18 3 1.0 2.0 0.4
18 4 1.0 2.0 0.1
Table 2: Ten municipalities with various ex ante differences in marginal collection costs
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